My research lies at the intersection of international and comparative political economy and explores how global economic integration shapes state behavior and firm strategies. Over the last two decades, more and more legalized international organizations and the fragmented production by multinational firms have yielded different winners and losers of globalization. Today, more than two-thirds of world trade occurs through global value chains because firms can split up their production of goods and services across the world. My two research streams examine how these key changes shape the politics of international economic transactions in the new era of globalization. 

 

One stream of my research focuses on the consequences of institutional design on state behavior; in particular, I examine the effects of legalization of international institutions on power asymmetries between wealthy and poor nations. In my dissertation, I examine whether international trade institutions help put small and weak states on an equal footing with powerful states, thereby maintaining the liberal international trade order. Other streams of my research emphasize the causes and consequences of globalization; in particular, I examine the effect of fragmented global production on strategic behavior by states and firms using disaggregated trade and FDI data.